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Abstract
We propose a new strategy to identify the existence of interjurisdictional tax com-
petition and to estimate its spatial reach. Our strategy rests on dierences between de-
sired tax levels, determined by culture-specic preferences, and equilibrium tax levels,
determined by interjurisdictional scal externalities as well as by preferences. While
scal preferences dier systematically and demonstrably between French-speaking and
German-speaking Swiss regions, we nd that local income tax burdens do not change
discretely at the language border but exhibit smooth spatial gradients. The slope
of these gradients implies that tax competition constrains tax choices of jurisdictions
with a preference for higher taxes at a distance of up to 20 kilometres. Hence, tax
competition does constrain income taxation by local governments. When, as in the
Swiss system, local jurisdictions are constrained to decide on a single shifter of an
exogenously given tax schedule, the eect of tax competition are conned to a small
spatial scale.
JEL classi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1Tax competition over mobile resources is a theoretically well understood mechanism.
Yet, rigorous research allowing this mechanism to be identied empirically remains com-
paratively scarce. We employ a quasi-experimental design using measurable and discrete
spatial dierences in voter preferences as a means to search for evidence of tax competi-
tion. The related empirical literature has traditionally treated cultural dierences as an
exogenous covariate simply to be controlled for. We claim instead that systematic dier-
ences in voter preferences among jurisdictions oer a unique opportunity for identifying
the existence of tax competition as well as for estimating its spatial reach.
For resource-
ow tax competition to arise, two conditions need to hold. First, tax
bases have to be mobile in response to tax dierentials. This aspect has been extensively
studied, and a negative relationship between taxation and the location of individuals and
rms is well documented (see e.g. Hines [1996], Devereux and Grith [1998] for the U.S.,
and Feld and Kirchg assner [2002] for Switzerland).
The second condition is that in tax-setting, jurisdictions set tax rates strategically
with respect to the mobile tax base. Prior empirical research has estimated tax reaction
functions through spatial econometric models. However, identication of the existence of
strategic interactions among governments is typically plagued by the re
ection problem
(Manski [1993]). The most prominent empirical analyses of tax reaction functions include
a large set of controls including jurisdiction xed eects to control for time invariant dif-
ferences in preferences and amenities, and time xed eects to account for common shocks
(e.g. Devereux et al. [2008]). Identication therefore relies on the comparison of diering
time patterns of tax rates of the jurisdiction of interest and its neighbours. This approach
assumes that it is possible to control for all spatial and temporal observed and unobserved
correlations. If this assumption is violated, similarities of neighbouring communities will
lead to spurious estimates of tax interactions. Furthermore, identication relies on the
existence of substantial strategic variations in tax rates. However, unchanged tax rates do
not imply the absence of tax competition. Rather, they could be the equilibrium outcome
of tax competition.1
1Brueckner [2003] surveys the empirical literature on strategic interactions among jurisdictions and
points to three main challenges to the identication of tax competition. First, the variable of interest (tax
rates of neighbours) is endogenous by denition. Second, correlations between jurisdictional characteristics
and the error term may arise e.g. from endogenous sorting of households. Finally, omitted variables can
cause spatial error dependence that biases upwards the inferred intensity of policy interactions.
2We propose that the empirical study of tax competition be rethought along other lines
than estimating spatial reaction functions. Quasi-experimental methods seem to be well-
suited to solve these identication problems. Chirinko and Wilson [2008], Rathelot and
Sillard [2008], and Duranton et al. [2011] provide interesting applications, using state bor-
ders to identify the eect of local taxation on the location of manufacturing in the U.S., in
France and in the UK. They nd higher employment growth and rm entry when crossing
a state border, where local taxation is lower but locational characteristics unrelated to
taxation exhibit no spatial discontinuity. This conrms the mobility of the tax base, but
says nothing about the existence of strategic interactions among local jurisdictions.
Another issue is the identication of the spatial reach of tax competition, that is the
distance up to which tax competition exerts its pressure. The above literature assumes
implicitly or shows explicitly an inverse relationship between distance to a state border
and mobility of the tax base.2 Agrawal [2011] shows that localities set local sales tax rates
strategically as a function of the distance to a state border, where state sales taxes change
discontinuously.
Using a discrete and measurable discontinuity in voter preferences at the Swiss lan-
guage border, we propose a novel method to identify the presence of strategic interactions
in tax setting and the spatial reach of tax competition. Consider two jurisdictions where
a historically determined cultural break between the two leads to a sharp, constant and
measurable dierence in preferences over publicly provided goods. We expect jurisdictions
with a higher valuation for these goods to opt for higher taxes.3 However, if these jurisdic-
tions are spatially close, tax competition might constrain tax choices and reduce observed
tax dierentials relative to their desired levels. We propose to identify tax competition
and its spatial reach by comparing preference-related tax dierentials between jurisdictions
that share a common border at which preferences change discontinuously, and between ju-
risdictions with the same dierences in preferences, but that are not spatially close and
2A similar relationship between distance to a border and demand elasticity of cross-border consumption
is found in e.g. Lovenheim [2008].
3Alesina and Angeletos [2005] and Benabou and Tirole [2006] provide a theoretical model that links
dierent beliefs to dierent tax rates. In these models multiple equilibria arise, where one equilibrium type
is characterised by a belief that luck determines success, high taxes and high levels of redistribution (\Eu-
rope"), whereas the other is characterized by a belief that eort pays o, low taxes and low redistribution
(\U.S."). To our knowledge, there exists no empirical literature that estimates the eect of beliefs on tax
levels empirically.
3thus are less likely to compete with each other.
For empirical identication, we take advantage of the fact that, in Switzerland, scal
preferences dier systematically and demonstrably at the language border between French-
speaking and German-speaking regions within the three bilingual cantons, whereas other
characteristics and policies are identical on either side of that border. We show that
voting patterns in German-speaking municipalities consistently re
ect lower valuations
for publicly provided goods. Hence we expect these jurisdictions, other things equal, to
choose lower tax rates than their French-speaking counterparts. Comparing municipalities
located further away from the language border, and controlling for various municipality
characteristics, we indeed nd that culture-specic preferences are re
ected in statistically
signicant dierences in tax levels, with taxes in French-speaking municipalities being 0.45
standard deviations higher.
In the absence of strategic interactions among municipalities, we would expect tax
rates to jump discretely at the language border. We nd, however, that local income tax
burdens do not change discretely at the border, but exhibit smooth spatial gradients as
one moves away from the border. The slope of these estimated gradients implies that tax
competition signicantly constrains tax choices of the jurisdictions with a preference for
higher taxes at a distance of up to some 20 kilometres. This nding is consistent with
a setting of local tax competition among municipalities and ts moving and commuting
patterns in Switzerland.
Another prominent explanation of strategic tax interactions among local jurisdictions
is \yardstick competition", where voters inform themselves about the quality of their
politicians by comparing the performance of their government with the one of neighboring
jurisdictions. Rent-seeking governments are then disciplined by the threat of non-election
by their voters (Besley and Case [1995]). We provide evidence that it is not yardstick
competition that drives our results.
The paper is proceeds as follows. Section 1 presents a stylized tax competition model
allowing for dierent preferences for a publicly provided good in neighboring jurisdictions,
and it develops our strategy to identify tax competition. Section 2 provides relevant back-
ground on Switzerland and establishes the existence of systematic dierences in preferences
and taxation between the two main language regions. Section 3 contains the empirical
4analysis of the eect of culture on taxes, the existence of tax competition, and its spatial
reach. Section 4 discusses the results in light of commuting and moving patterns, yard-
stick competition, and tax competition over high-income and wealthy taxpayers. Section
5 concludes.
1 Identifying tax competition across cultural regions
As a fomal underpinning for our empirical strategy, we construct a two-region, two-
jurisdiction, tax competition model allowing for dierent region-level preferences. Consider
two jurisdictions where the residents derive their utility from a private consumption good
and a publicly provided good nanced by a residence-based proportional income tax. In
each jurisdiction, a homogeneous majority of residents are immobile and a homogeneous
minority are mobile. Mobile workers are more productive, value the publicly provided
good less, and can switch jurisdiction at a nite cost.4 Tax rates in each jurisdiction are
set by majority rule, that is, by the immobile workers. The timing is as follows: rst,
the representative immobile workers of each jurisdiction set simultaneously the tax rate.
Second, mobile workers choose where to reside depending on the tax rates of the two juris-
dictions and their mobility costs.Consider now two contiguous cultural regions, A and B.
Populations born in each region are characterized by dierent valuations of the publicly
provided good. We explore the resulting equilibrium tax rates for the case where the two
jurisdictions are located in the same region, and for the case where the jurisdictions belong
to dierent cultural regions.
Each jurisdiction hosts a unit mass of immobile workers. Their productivity  is
normalized to 1, as is their wage. Furthermore, each jurisdiction initially hosts x < 0:5
mobile workers. Mobile workers have productivity  > 1 and receive income  according
to their productivity. They can switch jurisdiction at a cost c  U[0; c].
We denote workers' utility U (C;G) with C standing for a private consumption good
and G for a publicly provided good. Workers fully consume their after-tax wage: C(ti) =
(1 ti), where i 2 fA;Bg stands for the region they live in. G is nanced by a residence-
based proportional income tax set by the representative immobile worker. G(ti;ni) is the
4This setting is borrowed from Smith and Webb [2001].
5publicly provided good produced and consumed in region i. It depends on the tax rate ti
and the endogenous number of mobile residents ni in the respective regions. We further
assume that more productive workers, and workers born in region A value the public good
relatively less. The culture-specic valuation of the publicly provided good is captured by
a parameter A for region A and B for region B.
Mobile workers take tax rates as given and choose where to live depending on their
specic mobility cost. In equilibrium, the mobility cost c
i that makes the mobile worker




















































 c is the fraction of stayers and
c
i
 c is the fraction of movers.
The immobile representative worker in region A, anticipating the location decision of

















This implicitly denes a tax reaction function tA(tB). The same logic leads to a tax
reaction function tB(tA) for region B. The intersection of these two tax reaction functions
denes equilibrium tax rates.
We solve the model assuming the following utility functions for mobile and immobile
workers born in region A:
Um
A = (1   ti);
Uim
A = (1   tA)1 A (G(tA;nA))
A ;
where G(tA;nA) = tA  nA.











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Note: Pairs of bars represent two neighboring jurisdictions that can be
located in the same cultural region, or one in region A and one in region
B. The line indicates the region border. White bars represent tax
rates without mobility. Dark grey and light grey bars are equilibrium
tax rates with mobility. If equilibrium tax rates are the same, mobile
workers do not move.
This specication represents, without loss of generality, the case where mobile workers
value only private consumption. Furthermore, we introduce a complementarity between
immobile and mobile workers in the production of the publicly provided good. If no mobile
worker resides in a region, no publicly provided good can be produced and immobile
workers have utility of zero. This complementarity rules out special cases where tax
reaction functions can be discontinuous and equilibrium tax rates may not exist. Solving





where one can show that @ti
@tj > 0, @ti
@(
 c
) > 0, and @ti
@i > 0 (see Appendix A.1). Taxes
are thus strategic complements. The ratio  c
 is an inverse measure of the intensity of tax
competition: when mobility costs,  c, relative to the wage  of mobile workers are lower,
equilibrium tax rates will be lower. Finally, tax rates are higher when immobile workers
have stronger preferences for the publicly provided good.
Figure 1 illustrates equilibrium tax rates with and without mobile workers for A =
70:2, B = 0:8 and a maximum mobility cost  c = 2. We concentrate on the case where
mobile workers represent a low fraction of the population (x = 0:25) but are four times as
productive as immobile workers ( = 4).5 Each pair of bars represents two neighboring
jurisdictions that can be located in the same cultural region, in which case immobile
workers have the same preferences, or they can lie on either side of the region border such
that immobile workers have dierent preferences for the publicly provided good. Without
mobility, tax rates perfectly re
ect the dierences in preferences (white bars in Figure 1)
and change discretely at the border between the two cultural regions. If some workers are
mobile, jurisdictions in region B still set higher tax rates, but the jurisdiction at the region
border has to lower its tax rate more than if it were in competition with a jurisdiction
from the same cultural region, because of the pressure imposed by low-preference and
hence low-tax jurisdictions on the other side of the border.6
The observed size of the tax dierential among jurisdictions located at the border be-
tween two cultural regions will therefore re
ect the joint eect of dierences in preferences
and tax competition. To disentangle the two eects, we need counterfactual jurisdictions
in each region that do not compete in taxes with jurisdictions of the other region. Assum-
ing that the mobility cost increases with distance, due, for instance, to longer commuting
to an unchanged workplace, one can use as counterfactual jurisdictions those located su-
ciently far away from the region border. If the size of the tax dierential is higher between
counterfactual jurisdictions located in the interior of two cultural regions than between
jurisdictions at the region border, this would represent evidence for the existence of tax
competition.
Our identication strategy thus depends on the crucial assumption that median voter
preferences for publicly provided goods are signicantly dierent across the two cultural
regions and change discretely at the border. If we can measure preferences, this assumption
can be tested empirically by comparing scal preferences in the two cultural regions and
at the region border.
5This matches the income dierence between the rst and the fourth income quartile in Switzerland.
6This conclusion is robust to varying the calibration of A and B. Note that, we imply that there
is no additional psychological cost of living in the other region. Higher mobility costs when changing
region would result in a higher tax dierential at the region border. Conversely, with a zero mobility cost,
all jurisdictions set the lowest possible positive tax rate, following standard race-to-the-bottom logic (see
Appendix Figure A.1).
8Table 1: Stated preferences for government spending and redistribution
Dierence
% of respondents agreeing German French French-German
Government redistribute wealth 46.22 66.81 20:58
(2:58)
More social services vs lower taxes 38.83 46.77 7:93
(3:06)
Government should spend more on...
health 29.11 47.51 18:40
(2:42)
education 51.25 53.46 2:21
(2:61)
retirement 28.04 49.3 21:33
(2:41)
unemployment benets 17.51 29.88 12:36
(2:08)
culture, arts 15.26 23.34 8:08
(1:98)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.  p<0.01,  p<0.05,  p<0.10.
The number of observations varies by question. German-speaking respondents:
1236-1600; French-speaking respondents: 325-482. Source: International So-
cial Survey Program (ISSP), Role of Government, 1996. Switzerland.
In the next section, we show the existence of large, persistent and discrete dierences in
voter preferences and local tax rates between the two main language regions in Switzerland.
2 Setting: Languages, preferences, and taxation in Switzer-
land
2.1 Language regions and culture
Switzerland consists of two main language regions, German and French.7 Eugster et al.
[2009] and Eugster et al. [2011] have shown that cultural dierences across language regions
are deeply rooted and reveal themselves in dierent attitudes toward work and demand
for social insurance.
Table 1 provides illustrative evidence from a 1996 survey on attitudes to government
spending and redistribution in the two largest Swiss language regions. French-speaking
respondents expressed consistently stronger support for redistribution and social services,
even at the expense of higher taxes. Especially, they favoured more government spending
in social policy areas such as health, retirement, and unemployment benets.
Such survey-based comparisons, while suggestive, do not provide rigorous evidence
of an eect of culture on preferences for government spending. In fact, demographic,
geographic or institutional characteristics might be correlated with the language divide
7Switzerland has four ocial languages, German, French, Italian, and Romansh. German is spoken by
63.7% of the population, French by 20.4%, Italian by 6.5%, and Romansh by 0.5%.
9Figure 2: Language regions and bilingual cantons in Switzerland
Note: Municipalities of the three bilingual cantons (Berne, Fribourg, and Valais) with a
majority of German-speaking residents are shown in dark grey. French-speaking municipal-
ities are in light grey. Cantonal borders are in black. We attribute each municipality to
a language region according to the majority language spoken, calculated using data of the
Swiss census 2000. Source: Swiss Federal Statistical Oce.
and should thus be controlled for. To circumvent this problem, we take advantage of the
fact that the French-German language border crosses three cantons, Berne, Fribourg, and
Valais (see Figure 2). We can therefore compare preferences within the same institutional
(cantonal) setting, and even directly at the language border, where demographic and
topographic characteristics exhibit no discontinuities. 8
As a measure of preferences, we use federal referendum outcomes at the municipality
level. Switzerland is characterised by a high degree of direct democracy, with citizens
voting regularly on a wide range of issues.9 We select all federal referenda from 1981 to
2009 on subjects that were presented by the federal government as having an in
uence on
the level of taxes. This includes all referenda on social insurance, and public budget issues
such as old age pensions, health insurance, debt-reduction measures, and scal transfers
8Within the three bilingual cantons, the language border between the French and German regions is
sharp. In fact, the percentage French (German) speaking residents jumps from 85% (9%) to 5% (90%)
when crossing the language border. This border is historically determined and stable over time.
9For example, in the year 2009, there have been 8 federal referenda and a median of 4 cantonal referenda
per canton.
10Table 2: Federal referenda having in
uence on taxes
Referenda ID Year Subject % Yes
A. Left-of-centre parties recommend \yes" and right-of-centre parties \no"
323 1984 Maternity insurance 15.8
352 1988 Old-age insurance 35.1
373 1992 Health insurance 39.3
415 1994 Health insurance 51.8
416 1994 Health insurance 23.4
423 1995 Old-age and disability insurance 27.6
444 1998 Old-age insurance 41.5
458 1999 Maternity insurance 39.0
469 2000 Old-age insurance 39.5
470 2000 Old-age insurance 46.0
484 2001 Capital gains tax 34.1
489.2 2002 Old-age insurance 46.4
499 2003 Health insurance 27.1
500 2003 Disability rights 37.7
503 2003 Education subsidies 31.6
508 2004 Old-age and disability insurance 31.4
523 2006 Old-age insurance 41.7
527 2006 Family subsidies 68.0
528 2007 Health insurance 28.8
536 2008 Old-age insurance 41.4
B. Right-of-centre parties recommend \yes" and left-of-centre parties \no"
328 1985 Education subsidies 47.6
398 1993 Unemployment insurance 70.4
437 1997 Unemployment insurance 49.2
439 1998 State budget balancing 70.7
451 1999 Home ownership 41.3
457 1999 Disability insurance 30.3
480 2001 Debt break 84.7
489.1 2002 Old-age insurance 46.4
492 2002 Unemployment insurance 56.1
507 2004 Old-age insurance 32.1
509 2004 Family and property taxation 34.1
514 2004 Fiscal transfers 64.4
531 2008 Business taxation 50.5
534 2008 Health insurance 30.5
Note: Federal referenda from 1981 to 2009 having an in
uence on taxes.
Referenda were selected using the ocial documents by the federal gov-
ernement, which are distributed to all citizens before the vote. Source:
http://www.swissvotes.ch
among cantons. Of these referenda, we keep those for which left-of-centre and right-of-
centre parties published opposite vote recommendations. Table 2 lists the 34 selected
referenda, which account for 14% of all federal referenda between 1981 and 2009. We split
these referenda into two groups, with the rst group containing all referenda for which
the left-of-center parties recommended a \yes" vote and the right-of-center parties a \no",
and the second group containing referenda with the reverse political constellation. We
construct a preference measure as the average of the share of \yes" votes for referenda in
the rst group and the share of \no" votes for referenda in the second group.
Figure 3 shows this municipality-level preference measure as a function of road dis-
tance to the language border. The language border (with distance 0) is dened as those


























































































































































































































































































































































Note: Municipal vote shares on federal referenda from 1981 to 2009
for which the referenda were presented by the Federal Council as in-
volving tax issues (see list in Table 2). Points show the average of the
share of \yes" for left-of-center votes and the share of \no" for right-
of-center votes at municipal level in the three bilingual cantons (Berne,
Fribourg, and Valais). Lines are 10 km moving averages weighted by
the number of municipalities. Road distance is negatively coded for
German-speaking municipalities and positively for French-speaking mu-
nicipalities. Road distances from the on-line route planner search.ch.
French-speaking municipalities that share a common border with a German-speaking mu-
nicipality. Distance for the remaining municipalities is then dened as road distance to
the closest language border municipality. Distance is negatively coded for Swiss-German
municipalities. Preferences show strong dierences in average levels and a discrete jump at
the language border. Voters in French-speaking municipalities show signicantly stronger
support for policies recommended by left-of-center parties. This evidence is stable over
time (see Appendix Figure A.2) and in line with the stated preferences summarized in Ta-
ble 1. In Section 3, we shall elaborate on this descriptive evidence and provide quantitative
estimates of the implied dierences in preferences accross the linguistic divide.
An interesting particularity of Switzerland is that inhabitants of municipalities can vote
on municipal tax levels, either directly by attending the communal assembly (80% of mu-
nicipalities) or indirectly through the election of representatives to municipal parliaments
(see e.g. Br ulhart and Jametti [2007] for more details). We thus expect French-speaking
municipalities to set higher tax rates than German-speaking ones.
122.2 Taxation
The Swiss scal system is highly decentralized. The smallest political units are the 2,591
municipalities, with a median population of some 1,000 inhabitants and a maximum of
422,640 (city of Zurich). Municipalities independently manage and nance a number of
public services, including schools, social services, energy supplies, and roads. On average,
50% of total municipal revenue come from own tax revenue, while 15% come from scal
transfers. The remaining revenue is divided between user fees and other income. Among
tax revenue, 69% are raised through resident-based income taxation, 9% from wealth
taxation, 16% from corporate taxation, and the remaining 6% are composed of property
and other taxes.10
Municipalities cannot determine their own tax schedules. Rather, the cantons decide
on the progressivity of the cantonal tax schedule, as well as on exemptions and deductions.
Municipalities can then only set a tax multiplier as a scalar shifter on the cantonal tax
schedule. This tax multiplier applies to income and wealth taxation. Moreover, corporate
taxation in the three bilingual cantons is closely linked to income tax schedules .11 This
implies that municipal tax policy is basically constrained to a single instrument, which in
turn allows for perfect comparability within cantons.
To ensure comparability across the three bilingual cantons, we standardize tax multi-
pliers by deducting their mean and dividing by their standard deviation within each canton
and year. Figure 4 plots average standardized municipal tax multipliers for the years 1980
to 2009 in the three bilingual cantons over the distance to the language border. Contrary
to referendum outcomes, tax multipliers do not jump at the language border.12 However,
French-speaking municipalities located further away from the language border set higher
tax rates than their German counterparts. It is this penomenon that we interpret as a
manifestation of tax competition: French-speaking municipalities located at the language
border would like to set higher tax rates according to their preferences. However, they are
constrained by the threat of mobile residents relocating to low-tax municipalities on the
10Municipalities levy 31% of all income and wealth taxes in Switzerland. This is more than the Confed-
eration (26%) and less than the cantons (43%).
11In the canton of Berne, both the income and the corporate tax share the same tax multiplier. In the
canton of Fribourg, tax multipliers are not exactly the same but have more than 90% correlation, while in
the canton of Valais, the corporate tax multiplier is constant across municipalities.
12As for preferences, the spatial pattern of tax multipliers is stable over time (see Appendix Figure A.2).







































































































































































































































































































































































Note: Points show average standardized municipal tax multipliers.
Lines are 10 km moving averages weighted by the number of municipal-
ities. Distance is negatively coded for German-speaking municipalities
and positively for French-speaking municipalities. Source: Income tax
multipliers from cantonal statistics (1980-2009) for cantons of Berne,
Fribourg, and Valais. Road distances from the on-line route planner
search.ch.
German-speaking side.
This constellation of measurable dierences in preferences and perfectly comparable tax
rates at the language border oers a unique setting for the identication of tax competition
and its spatial reach. We shall compare tax dierentials among municipalities directly at
the language border, where preferences change discontinuously, and among counterfactual
municipalities with the same dierences in preferences but located further away from the
border.
3 Baseline results
3.1 Descriptive statistics and sample selection
Our identication strategy requires that municipalities dier only with respect to prefer-
ences and distance to the language border. That is, we seek to compare municipalities on
both sides of the language border that share the same characteristics, such as population,
economic structure, and geographic features. We have therefore collected a wealth of data
14on of municipality characteristics, including population size and population characteris-
tics (age structure, religion, income categories), economic activity (employment shares by
sectors, economic center, urban area, tourism), and geographic attributes (altitude, area,
lake shore).
Controlling for these covariates in a regression may rely too much on extrapolation if
there is little overlap in municipality characteristics on both sides of the language border
(see Imbens and Rubin [2010]). We therefore restrict our sample to the common sup-
port using a propensity score approach. We estimate for each municipality the predicted
probability of being in the French-speaking region (propensity score) using all exogenous
background characteristics. It has been shown by Rosenbaum and Rubin [1983] that ob-
servations with the same propensity score are indeed comparable. To achieve a common
support in the two language regions, we drop all municipalities with a propensity score
higher (lower) than the maximum (minimum) score in the other region. To be even more
restrictive in the common support, we drop also all observations with a propensity score
above 0.9 and below 0.1.13
We apply this procedure separately for municipalities at the language border and
counterfactual municipalities further away from the border. We rst dene municipalities
at the language border to be in a bandwidth from 0 to 20 kilometers and counterfactual
municipalities from 21 to 40 kilometers.
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for taxes, preferences, and background charac-
teristics of municipalities. Column (1) shows means for all municipalities located within
40 kilometers from the language border. Columns (2)-(4) show dierences in means be-
tween the French and the German language regions for all municipalities, those at the
language border, and counterfactual municipalities. Columns (5)-(8) contain the same
statistics for the trimmed sample, based on a propensity score estimated using only the
exogenous background characteristics of panel B leaving aside the potentially endogenous
migration-related characteristics in panel C. In fact, income and education structures of
the population may be in
uenced by migration 
ows and be partly caused by tax policy.
This implies a trade-o between controlling for endogenous covariates and possible omit-
13We implemented alternative specications of the propensity score and the trimming procedure following















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































16ted variable bias. Our baseline results are based on the specication excluding migration
related characteristics.14
Column (2) suggests statistically signicant dierences in taxes, preferences, but also
some background characteristics across the language regions. Our identication of tax
competition relies on the comparison of tax multipliers of municipalities at the language
border (column (3)) and counterfactual municipalities (column (4)). Statistically signi-
cant dierences in tax multipliers in counterfactual municipalities but not at the language
border provide rst evidence for tax competition, given that dierences in preferences are
always statistically signicant. However, this could still re
ect dierences in background
characteristics of municipalities rather than true causal evidence.
In columns (5)-(8), we therefore restrict our sample to the common support. This
reduces the number of municipalities but achieves a better balancing of background char-
acteristics. The only remaining statistically signicant dierences in background charac-
teristics are economically negligible. Strikingly, the pattern of dierences in taxes and
preferences remains unaected. To provide further causal evidence on the existence of
tax competition, we investigate these dierentials controlling for remaining dierences in
municipality characteristics.
3.2 Regression results
We now estimate the dierence in tax rates between the two language regions separately
for municipalities located at the language border (0-20 kilometers) and for counterfactual
municipalities (21-40 kilometers), controlling for background characteristics using regres-
sion procedures in the full and in the trimmed sample. The estimation of propensity
scores and tax dierentials is then repeated for bandwidths of 15 and 10 kilometers. Table
4 presents dierences in taxes and preferences across the language regions. Columns (1)
and (2) show regression estimates using all municipalities, and columns (3) and (4) restrict
the sample to the common support.15
14Results are also robust to the inclusion of migration related controls. See Appendix ??.
15A natural extension of regression on a trimmed sample would be to use matching on the propensity
score. However, in our setting, this has two limitations: rst, matching methods require a large number
of observations; second, standard errors are biased because they do not account for the estimation of the
propensity score in the rst stage and the correlations within and across panels.
17Table 4: French-German dierentials in taxes and voting preferences
All municipalities Trimmed sample
Dependent variables Taxes Vote shares Taxes Vote shares
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A : Bandwidth of 20 km
0-20 km  0:131 0:573  0:101 0:561
(0:088) (0:055) (0:092) (0:045)
No. of French municipalities 130 130 97 97
No. of German municipalities 98 98 87 87
21-40 km 0:406 0:632 0:446 0:621
(0:107) (0:060) (0:114) (0:063)
No. of French municipalities 81 81 75 75
No. of German municipalities 116 116 99 99
Panel B : Bandwidth of 15 km
0-15 km  0:092 0:631  0:059 0:597
(0:101) (0:054) (0:111) (0:051)
No. of French municipalities 96 96 62 62
No. of German municipalities 81 81 58 58
16-30 km 0:296 0:578 0:339 0:552
(0:113) (0:066) (0:119) (0:069)
No. of French municipalities 88 88 82 82
No. of German municipalities 75 75 73 73
31-45 km 0:391 0:618 0:487 0:606
(0:140) (0:080) (0:148) (0:081)
No. of French municipalities 33 33 27 27
No. of German municipalities 83 83 56 56
Panel C : Bandwidth of 10 km
0-10 km  0:069 0:591  0:071 0:557
(0:142) (0:064) (0:153) (0:071)
No. of French municipalities 66 66 41 41
No. of German municipalities 49 49 37 37
11-20 km  0:246 0:476  0:300 0:473
(0:109) (0:079) (0:122) (0:070)
No. of French municipalities 64 64 45 45
No. of German municipalities 49 49 40 40
21-30 km 0:549 0:634 0:617 0:626
(0:138) (0:084) (0:145) (0:090)
No. of French municipalities 54 54 51 51
No. of German municipalities 58 58 56 56
31-40 km 0:204 0:697 0:231 0:672
(0:137) (0:073) (0:141) (0:069)
No. of French municipalities 27 27 21 21
No. of German municipalities 58 58 40 40
No. of years 30 30 30 30
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.  p<0.01, p<0.05, p<0.10. Dependent variables are
standardized tax multipliers and standardized vote shares in support for left-of-center referenda.
Common support: propensity score estimated using background characteristics from panel B in
Table 3. All municipalities with a propensity score = 2 (0:1; 0:9) and higher (lower) than the
maximum (minimum) score in the other language region dropped. Standard errors clustered by
municipality and year.
Panel A of Table 4 presents our baseline results. Estimates for the full and the trimmed
samples are very similar. Dierences in vote shares between French and German-speaking
municipalities are about 0.6 standard deviations, for both border and counterfactual muni-
cipalities, and always statistically signicant. This eect is also economically large since it
represents about 8 percentage points' dierence in the support of left-of-center referenda
(compared to a mean support of 44 percentage points).
If culture-specic preferences alone in
uence tax setting, we expect higher tax rates
in French-speaking than German-speaking municipalities, for both border and counterfac-
tual municipalities. Our results support this hypothesis for municipalities located further
18away from the language border, for which we nd a statistically signicant dierence of
0.45 standard deviations in tax multipliers. This dierence in taxes is also economically
relevant. To illustrate this, we can compute the tax liability for a representative taxpayer,
who is married and has a gross annual income of CHF 80,000 ($ 100,000), in the three
bilingual cantons. Our estimates suggest that French-speaking taxpayers are willing to
accept a 2.5% higher total annual tax liability (or about CHF 200).
At the language border, however, we do not nd any statistically signicant dierences
in taxes.16 This implies the existence of tax competition, because we expect French-
speaking municipalities located at the language border to limit their tax rates in order to
retain mobile taxpayers from moving to the German side.17
In order to estimate the spatial reach of tax competition, we repeat the above analysis
for smaller bandwidths. Panel B of Table 4 shows the results for bandwidths of 15 kilome-
ters. Dierences in preferences are very stable, while dierences in taxes exhibit a smooth
spatial gradient. Reducing bandwidths further to 10 kilometers, the general pattern is
conrmed, that is, the tax dierential is higher for municipalities located further away
from the language border.
We propose a measure of the spatial reach of tax competition by combining results from
panels A and B. Both panels show that tax dierentials exhibit a smooth spatial gradient,
suggesting a stronger constraint from tax competition for municipalities located closer
to the language border. If we dene the spatial reach of tax competition as the distance
beyond which tax dierentials become statistically signicant, our results indicate a spatial
reach of tax competition between 15 and 20 kilometers.
Figure 5 summarizes our ndings graphically. We use counterfactual municipalities of
one language region to predict the tax rates that would have been predicted for border
municipalities within the same language region if there were no dierence in preferences
and only intraregional tax competition.18 The graph sheds light on two important con-
16Note also that condence intervals of coecients on tax dierentials at the language border and for
counterfactual municipalities do not overlap.
17Note that if mobility costs were higher when moving to the other language region (because of cultural
and language dierences) than within the same region, we would expect a higher tax dierential at the
language border than with equal mobility costs everywhere. Finding no dierential at the language border
reinforce our result on the existence of tax competition.
18We predict tax multipliers in the French-speaking region on the base of the common support regression
including only French-speaking municipalities located between 20 and 40 kilometers and vice versa for the






























































































































































































































































Note: Lines are 10 km moving averages of tax multipliers weighted by
the number of observations. The dashed line in the French-speaking
region represents predicted tax multipliers on the base of the com-
mon support regression including only French-speaking municipalities
located between 20 and 40 kilometers. The dashed line in the German-
speaking region are predicted tax multipliers estimated using German-
speaking municipalities located between -40 and -20 kilometers. Shaded
areas are 90% condence intervals. Distance is negatively coded for
German-speaking municipalities and positively for French-speaking mu-
nicipalities. Source: Income tax multipliers from cantonal statistics
(1980-2009) for cantons of Berne, Fribourg, and Valais. Road distances
from the on-line route planner search.ch.
clusions. First, at the language border, we predict statistically signicantly higher tax
rates for French-speaking municipalities if they were not exposed to tax competition with
German-speaking municipalities (dashed line) compared to observed tax rates. Second,
the solid line turns statistically signicantly dierent from the dashed line between 15 and
20 kilometers, which is consistent with our regression-based estimate of the spatial reach
of tax competition.
4 Discussion
4.1 Moving and commuting
Mobility of taxpayers is a prerequisite for the existence of resource-
ow income tax com-
petition. Using individual data of the 2000 Federal Population Census covering all Swiss
German-speaking region.

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































Note: Figure 6(a): Road distance between the residence municipality in 1995 and 2000 for all individuals
older than 15 residing in one of the three bilingual cantons in 2000. The dashed line refers to all individuals.
The solid line refers to individuals that have moved across municipalities. Figure 6(b): Road distance of
commuting for all individuals residing in one of the three bilingual cantons and working in Switzerland.
Source: Federal Population Census 2000. Swiss Federal Statistical Oce. Road distances from the on-line
route planner search.ch. .
residents, we rst investigate moving behavior in our three bilingual sample cantons. For
each individual older than 15, we compute the road distance between their current munic-
ipality of residence and that of 1995. The dashed line in Figure 6(a) plots the cumulative
frequency of moving distances. Some 80% of the population have either not moved, or
moved only within their current municipality of residence. For the 20% of movers, the
solid line plots the cumulative frequency of moving distances. About half of the movers
stay within a radius of 20 kilometers of their former municipality of residence.
The willingness to commute is another important determinant of the existence of tax
competition and its spatial reach. Recall that municipalities in Switzerland, when set-
ting their tax multipliers, cannot target a specic income group but compete mostly for a
heterogeneous pool of individuals choosing where to reside around a central labour mar-
ket. Figure 6(b) plots the cumulative frequency of commuting distances for all employed
individuals in the three bilingual cantons. More than 80% of individuals reside within a
radius of 20 kilometers from their workplace. This prevalence of mostly local mobility is
consistent with our interpretation of the results in terms of resource-
ow tax competition
and with our measure of its spatial reach f some 20 kilometers.
214.2 Yardstick competition
In a yardstick competition setting, voters evaluate the eciency of their government by
comparing the supply of publicly provided goods relative to the taxes paid in their juris-
diction against that ratio in neighboring jurisdictions (see e.g. Geys [2006], Revelli and
Tovmo [2007]). With yardstick competition, this ratio, and thus potentially also local tax
rates, are spatially correlated in equilibrium, as rent-seeking politicians are disciplined by
the threat of non re-election.
To test the yardstick competition argument, we have collected data on nancial ratings
of municipalities in the three bilingual cantons, where municipalities are ranked on a scale
from C to Aaa. These ratings, when purged from municipality background characteristics,
can be used as a proxy for the eciency of municipality governments. Figure 7 repeats the
exercise presented in Figure 5 where the ratings have been transformed into a dummy vari-
able and 1 denotes nancial ratings better than the median (Aa+, the second of 16 ranks).
This gure suggests that German-speaking municipalities are more eciently run than the
French-speaking ones. Furthermore, there is no clear spatial trend within the language
regions. With yardstick competition, we would expect the French-speaking municipalities
at the language border to have better ratings than those further away from the language
border. Thus, yardstick competition seems not to be the cause of the convergence of tax
rates at the language border.
4.3 Tax competition over high-income and wealthy taxpayers
Our results so far rely on the comparison across the language border of municipal tax
multipliers in the three bilingual cantons. This sample oers the cleanest possible setting
in terms of comparability of the tax variable, as the underlying cantonal tax schedule is
held constant. We now extend our analysis to a complementary dataset including average
tax rates on high-income and wealthy individuals for all municipalities in Switzerland.
This allows us to concentrate on a presumably less local and possibly more intense area
of strategic tax setting, namely inter-municipal and inter-cantonal tax competition. This
extension comes at the cost of a somewhat reduced comparability of the relevant tax
22Figure 7: Predicted and actual nancial ratings
Note: Lines are 10 km moving averages of nancial ratings weighted by
the number of observations. The nancial rating variable is a dummy
for a rating better than the median. The dashed line in the French-
speaking region represents predicted nancial ratings on the base of
the common support regression including only French-speaking munic-
ipalities located between 20 and 40 kilometres. The dashed line in
the German-speaking region represents predicted nancial ratings esti-
mated using German-speaking municipalities located between -40 and
-20 kilometres. Shaded areas are 90% condence intervals. Distance
is negatively coded for German-speaking municipalities and positively
for French-speaking municipalities. Source: Financial ratings of mu-
nicipalities of the cantons of Berne, Fribourg, and Valais for the year
2009 from fedan AG . Road distances from the on-line route planner
search.ch.
instruments. We now combine municipal and cantonal tax instruments, and do not control
for all other policies and institutions that vary across cantons and may in
uence the
location decision of rich taxpayers.
We have collected cantonal and municipal average tax rates for a non-married taxpayer
with a gross annual income of CHF 500,000 and average tax rates for a married taxpayer
with net wealth of CHF 5,000,000.19 Using this dataset, we repeat the analysis of Section
19These categories corresponds to the penultimate income, respectively wealth category, for which we
have data on average tax rates for the 813 largest municipalities in Switzerland. These rates are published
annually by the Swiss Federal Tax Administration in Charges scales en Suisse. We compute the average
tax rate for each of the about 2,591 municipalities as follows: We collect all municipal tax multipliers for
the years 2005 to 2009. As these tax multipliers are the main determinant of dierences in tax rates within
a same canton, we can combine these two datasets by a regression procedure and interpolate the average
tax rates for each municipality. There exist two other sources of variation in municipal average tax rates
within cantons. First, in some cantons, school districts do not overlap with municipal borders and can levy
their own taxes. Second, in some cantons, Catholic and Protestant churches can levy their own taxes on
their members. These specicities create small prediction errors.
23Figure 8: Predicted and actual average tax rates on high-income and wealthy taxpayers




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Note: Lines are 10 km moving averages of average tax rates (cantonal and municipal tax rates)
weighted by the number of observations. The dashed line in the French-speaking region represents
predicted tax rates on the base of the common support regression including only French-speaking
municipalities located between 40 and 80 kilometers. The dashed line in the German-speaking region
represents predicted tax rates estimated using German-speaking municipalities located between -80
and -40 kilometers. Shaded areas are 90% condence intervals. Distance is negatively coded for
German-speaking municipalities and positively for French-speaking municipalities. Source: Average
tax rates on income and wealth: own calculation based on cantonal statistics (2005-2009). Road
distances from the on-line route planner search.ch. .
3.2 for bandwidths of 20 and 40 kilometers. We restrict the analysis to within 80 kilometers
from the language border to keep the general context of tax competition across language
regions.20
Figure 8 repeats the exercise presented in Figure 5. Municipalities located between
40 and 80 kilometers from the language border are used to predict average tax rates for
municipalities located closer to the language border. The two graphs illustrate well the
eect of tax competition in reducing tax dierentials at the language border. Furthermore,
they shed light on the spatial reach of tax competition over the most lucrative taxpayers,
which is estimated at approximately 35 kilometers for income taxes and 45 kilometers for
wealth taxes. This larger spatial reach makes sense, as high-income and wealthy taxpayers
are reasonably characterized by the highest mobility among taxpayers.
20The maximum distance in the German (French) speaking part amounts to 228 (140) kilometers.
245 Conclusions
We propose a new quasi-experimental strategy to identify tax competition by exploit-
ing systematic and measurable dierences in preferences among spatially proximate local
jurisdictions. These exogenous dierences in preferences oer a way of determining the
existence of tax competition and of estimating its spatial reach.
We develop a stylized tax competition model allowing for dierent preferences for
a public good in neighboring jurisdictions and deduce from it our identication of tax
competition. Applying this identication strategy to the Swiss language border, we show
that preferences approximated by referenda outcomes dier persistently, discretely and
statistically signicantly between the French and the German-speaking regions of the three
bilingual cantons. Voting patterns are invariant to distance from the language border.
Second, we investigate the eect of preference dierentials on local tax rates. We nd
an economically and statistically signicant eect of culture on taxes: a 0.6 standard
deviation higher support for left-of-center referenda is associated with about 0.45 standard
deviation higher tax rates. Third, we identify tax competition by comparing the tax
dierential implied by the preference dierential with the tax dierential of municipalities
located directly at the language border. Border municipalities are found to have the
same dierences in preferences as non-border municipalities, but the tax dierential at the
language border is zero. This is compelling evidence for the importance of tax competition.
Repeating the analysis across dierent distance bandwidths, we estimate the spatial
reach of tax competition at about 20 kilometers. This is consistent with general moving
and commuting patterns in Switzerland. Our result can be interpreted as a lower bound
on the spatial reach of tax competition, as the underlying tax instrument is restricted
to aect all elements of the tax base equally. Extending the analysis to inter-municipal
and inter-cantonal tax competition targeted at very rich taxpayers, we consistently nd a
larger spatial reach of about 40 kilometers. This result suggests that the spatial reach of
tax competition depends on the underlying tax instruments available to local jurisdictions.
Limiting these instruments could be one option for policy makers concerned about the po-
tential harms of tax competition. The link between the range of available tax instruments
and the spatial reach of tax competition would appear to be a fruitful object of further
25empirical examination and will shed some light on the theoretical debate on preferential
regimes (see Janeba and Peters [1999]; Keen [2001]).
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28A Appendix
A.1 Model
We solve the model using the following utility functions for mobile and immobile workers
coming from region A:
Um
A = (1   ti);
Uim
A = (1   tA)1 A (G(tA;nA))
A;
where G(tA;nA) = tA  nA.
Mobile workers take tax rates as given and choose where to live depending on their






















which leads to the following tax reaction function:21
tA(tB) =
2A +  c











One can show that @tA
@tB > 0 and @tA
@(
 c
) > 0 as long as 2
A < 1, which is always the case
as  2 (0;1). Similarly, @tA
@A > 0 for all values of  c
 + tB.
Figure A.1 presents equilibrium tax rates for dierent preference parameters and ratio
 c
.










2(1+A) . We rule out this tax reaction function, as it does not lead to an
equilibrium.











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Note: Pairs of bars represent two neighboring jurisdictions that can be located in the same cultural
region, or one in region A and one in region B. The line indicates the region border. White bars
represent tax rates without mobility. Dark grey and light grey bars are equilibrium tax rates with
mobility. If equilibrium tax rates are the same, mobile workers do not move.
30A.2 Voting preferences and tax multipliers for dierent time spans
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Note: Municipal vote shares on federal
referenda from 1981 to 2009 for which
the referenda were presented by the Fed-
eral Council as involving tax issues (see
list in Table 2). Points show the aver-
age of the share of \yes" for left-of-center
votes and the share of \no" for right-of-
center votes at municipal level in the three
bilingual cantons (Berne, Fribourg, and
Valais). Lines are 10 km moving aver-
ages weighted by the number of municipali-
ties. Road distance is negatively coded for
German-speaking municipalities and pos-
itively for French-speaking municipalities.





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Note: Points show average standardized
municipal tax multipliers. Lines are 10
km moving averages weighted by the num-
ber of municipalities. Distance is nega-
tively coded for German-speaking munici-
palities and positively for French-speaking
municipalities. Source: Income tax multi-
pliers from cantonal statistics for the can-
tons of Berne, Fribourg, and Valais. Road
distances from the on-line route planner
search.ch.
31